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NON-STRICT STRICT SCRUTINY: THE 
FIFTH CIRCUIT AND THE GRUTTER 
STANDARD IN FISHER v. UNIVERSITY  
OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
Michelle Parilo* 
Abstract: On January 18, 2011, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a university’s admis-
sions policy was constitutional because it had a compelling interest in 
achieving a critical mass of minority students and did not strive for out-
right racial balancing for its own sake. Although the Fifth Circuit’s hold-
ing aligns with the Supreme Court’s standard in Grutter v. Bollinger, it ex-
emplifies how Grutter discourages universities from experimenting to 
create better race-conscious admissions policies. 
Introduction 
 Abigail Fisher and Rachel Michalewicz were denied admission to 
the University of Texas at Austin (UT) and challenged its use of race in 
its undergraduate admissions.1 In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 
Fisher and Michalewicz, both Caucasian, alleged that UT discriminated 
against them on the basis of race in violation of their right to equal pro-
tection under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment in 
favor of UT, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed, holding that UT’s use of race mirrored that of the policy 
approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.3 The Fifth Cir-
cuit analyzed UT’s admissions policy using a strict scrutiny standard 
and held that the admissions policy was constitutional because UT had 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ), 631 F.3d 213, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g 
denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) 
(No. 11-345). 
2 Id. at 217; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I ), 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (W.D. 
Tex. 2009). 
3 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 217–18, 247; Fisher I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 613; see Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
35 
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a compelling interest in achieving a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority students.4 
 Judge Garza concurred with the Fifth Circuit majority, but noted 
that the Grutter standard is “markedly less demanding” than strict scru-
tiny.5 According to Judge Garza, the Grutter standard is problematic be-
cause it does not provide courts with a clear approach to analyzing race-
conscious admissions policies.6 Consequently, universities may simply 
follow the race-conscious admissions policy approved in and avoid ex-
perimentation with other racially inclusive policies.7 
I. UT’s Admissions Policy Under the Grutter Standard 
 When the appellants in Fisher applied for admission in 2008, UT’s 
admissions policy was largely shaped by the “Top Ten Percent Law,” a 
legislative initiative that guaranteed admission to Texas students in the 
top ten percent of their high school class.8 That year, UT filled 88% of 
the seats it allotted to Texas residents pursuant to the Top Ten Percent 
Law.9 Plaintiffs, both Texas residents, were denied admission to UT and 
challenged its admissions policy for those Texas applicants not admit-
ted pursuant to the Top Ten Percent Law.10 
 Texas applicants not admitted pursuant to the Top Ten Percent 
Law were evaluated based on their Academic and Personal Achievement 
Indices.11 The Academic Index was a computation of an applicant’s 
standardized test scores and high school class rank.12 The applicant’s 
Personal Achievement Index was based on evaluation of two required 
essays and “the personal achievement score.”13 In calculating the per-
                                                                                                                      
4 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 230–31, 247. 
5 Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 258. 
7 Id. at 258–59. 
8 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (Vernon 1997); see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin 
(Fisher II ), 631 F.3d 213, 216, 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345). The Texas legisla-
ture enacted the “Top Ten Percent Law” in response to the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 decision in 
Hopwood v. Texas, a case that struck down UT’s law school admissions policy because it con-
sidered race directly and often made race a “controlling factor.” Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 223–
24. Because the “Top Ten Percent Law” is facially race-neutral, the plaintiffs did not chal-
lenge it in this case. See id. at 217, 239. 
9 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 227. 
10 Id. at 217, 227. Texas applicants not admitted pursuant to the “Top Ten Percent 
Law” amounted to 1216 admission offers in 2008. Id. at 227. 
11 Id. at 227. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 227–28. 
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sonal achievement score, admissions personnel took into consideration 
an applicant’s entire file.14 UT considered race as part of an applicant’s 
file, thereby factoring race into an applicant’s personal achievement 
score.15 
 UT’s use of race to classify people in its admissions policy auto-
matically triggered a strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was a race-based clas-
sification.16 Courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of review whenever 
race is used to classify people because a core purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is to eliminate discriminatory racial classifications.17 To be 
constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis, the racial classification 
must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental inter-
est.18 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter is the model for other 
courts in strictly scrutinizing admissions policies in the university con-
text.19 In Grutter, the Court rejected a plaintiff’s constitutional challenge 
to the race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Michigan 
Law School (the “Law School”).20 The Court held that the Law School’s 
admissions policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it 
was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.21  
 In finding a compelling interest, the Grutter Court expressly de-
ferred to the Law School’s expertise in deciding that diversity was es-
sential to its mission.22 As part of its mission, the Law School sought to 
admit a “critical mass” of minority students to ensure that underrepre-
sented groups would be able to make a meaningful contribution to the 
school’s character.23 The Court reasoned that the Law School had a 
compelling interest in admitting a critical mass of minority students 
because diversity enriched the learning environment and prepared 
                                                                                                                      
14 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 228. 
15 Id. at 228–29. 
16 Id. at 231. Appellants, on the other hand, urged the court to apply the strong-basis-
in-evidence standard when evaluating whether the remedial actions were necessary, which 
would have been more restrictive than a deferential form of strict scrutiny review. Id. at 
232. Noting that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard has been applied in cases regarding 
discrimination in public employment, the court refused to apply it here. See id. at 232–33. 
17 See id. at 247–48 (Garza, J., concurring); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650–51 
(1993). 
18 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 231. 
19 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 218, 247. 
20 539 U.S. at 311, 343. 
21 Id. at 343. 
22 Id. at 327–28. 
23 See id. at 316 (citing the Law School’s admissions policy). 
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students for an increasingly diverse work force.24 The Court recounted 
witness testimony which explained that a critical mass is not numeri-
cally defined, but more aptly described through abstract concepts such 
as “meaningful numbers,” “meaningful representation,” and “a number 
that encourages underrepresented minority students to participate in 
the classroom and not feel isolated.”25 The critical mass a school needs 
to achieve such abstract concepts may be defined in relation to the 
educational benefits the school seeks with its diversity policy.26 The 
Court found that the Law School’s policy was narrowly tailored because 
each applicant was evaluated in a highly individualized and holistic 
manner, and race was considered in conjunction with many other fac-
tors.27 Therefore, the Court held that the Law School’s policy was con-
stitutional because it narrowly tailored its use of race to further its 
compelling interest in diversity.28 
 In Fisher, the Fifth Circuit followed the Grutter analysis and held that 
UT had a compelling interest in enrolling a critical mass of underrepre-
sented minority students.29 UT sought to obtain a critical mass of minor-
ity students by pursuing three distinct educational objectives articulated 
in Grutter—enhancing classroom discussion, preparing students for the 
professional world, and promoting effective participation in civic life by 
people of all backgrounds.30 Like the Grutter Court, the Fisher court re-
fused to define “critical mass” by numbers or benchmarks, and instead 
explained that it “‘is defined by reference to the educational benefits 
that diversity is designed to produce.’”31 The Fifth Circuit also deferred 
to UT’s judgment that diversity would have educational benefits, noting 
that universities have the most experience in this area and are best 
equipped to make such determinations.32 The court further concluded 
                                                                                                                      
 
24 See id. at 330, 343. 
25 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–19 (internal quotations omitted). 
26 See id. at 330. 
27 Id. at 334, 337–38 (including as bases for diversity factors such as travel abroad, lan-
guage fluency, community service, career achievements, and the ability to overcome per-
sonal hardship). 
28 Id. at 329–30, 343. 
29 Fisher II, 645 F.3d at 230–31. 
30 See id. at 219–20, 230–31. Appellants argued that UT’s special concern for minority 
groups neglects “the diverse contributions of others,” so it amounts to racial balancing. Id. 
at 235–36. The court conceded that UT gave attention to minority groups, but said that 
this was an educational benefit and therefore not unconstitutional. Id. at 236. 
31 Id. at 245 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 
32 See id. at 231 (explaining that “the Supreme Court has held that ‘[c]ontext matters’ 
when evaluating race-based governmental action, and a university’s educational judgment 
in developing diversity policies is due deference”); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“The freedom of a university to make its own judgments 
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that UT’s admissions policy was narrowly tailored.33 Similar to the Law 
School in Grutter, UT used a “holistic, multi-factor approach” in evaluat-
ing applications, and recognized race as only one of a broad range of 
qualities and experiences that could contribute to diversity.34 
 Appellants argued that UT’s minority enrollment had already met 
or exceeded a critical mass because UT’s total minority enrollment had 
increased over the years, rendering the reintroduction of race into its 
admissions policy unconstitutional.35 The Fifth Circuit reinforced the 
notion that a critical mass cannot have a “fixed upper bound that ap-
plies across different schools, different degrees, different states, differ-
ent years, different class sizes, and different racial and ethnic subcom-
position.”36 Moreover, given societal changes in Texas, such as “vast 
increases” in its Hispanic population, the Fifth Circuit accepted UT’s 
“good faith conclusion” that it had not achieved a critical mass.37 
 Although the Fifth Circuit did not agree with the appellants that 
UT had already reached a critical mass, the court cautioned that, “[i]n 
this dynamic environment,” the court would not be able to “bless the 
university’s race-conscious admissions program in perpetuity.”38 As Jus-
tice O’Connor observed in Grutter, the use of racial preferences in ad-
missions policies may no longer be necessary in the foreseeable fu-
ture.39 For now, UT may include race as a factor in its admissions to the 
extent that it helps the university achieve “the educational benefits that 
flow from diversity.”40 
                                                                                                                      
as to education includes the selection of its student body.”). The district court found, and 
the Fifth Circuit reiterated, that like the policy in Grutter, UT’s policy attempted to pro-
mote the understanding of different minority groups, “break down racial stereotypes,” 
help students “function in a multi-cultural workforce,” and “cultivate the next set of na-
tional leaders . . . .” Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 230 (internal quotations omitted). 
33 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 218, 228, 247. 
34 See id. This vision of diversity was described in Bakke as “encompass[ing] a far 
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a 
single though important element.” 438 U.S. at 315. 
35 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 242. 
36 Id. at 243. 
37 See id. at 244. 
38 Id. at 246. 
39 See 539 U.S. at 343. Justice O’Connor wrote that the Court expects the use of racial 
preferences to be unnecessary in twenty-five years. Id. 
40 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 247. 
40 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
II. Scrutinizing the Grutter Standard 
 UT’s admissions policy conformed to the Supreme Court’s stan-
dard in Grutter by including race as one of many considerations.41 The 
only way for the appellants to challenge such a policy is if the Supreme 
Court calls Grutter into doubt.42 While the Fifth Circuit majority did not 
inquire into the constitutionality of Grutter, Judge Garza took issue with 
the fact that the Grutter Court detoured from constitutional first princi-
ples.43 In his concurrence, Judge Garza argued that Grutter is wrong 
because its standard is “markedly less demanding” than the strict scru-
tiny analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 According to Judge 
Garza, the Grutter Court applied a relaxed version of strict scrutiny, and 
therefore he called for the Supreme Court to overturn it.45 
 Judge Garza argued that if courts properly applied the strict 
scrutiny standard, then race should not matter in university admis-
sions.46 Under the typically rigorous strict scrutiny standard, the gov-
ernment must show that its policy is sufficiently compelling to justify 
discrimination based on race, that the means chosen are the least harm-
ful, and that it is narrowly tailored.47 To prove this, a party must show 
“serious, good faith consideration” of race-neutral alternatives.48 Thus, 
typical strict scrutiny is a high bar, as proven by the Court’s rejection of a 
number of “intuitively appealing” reasons for using racial discrimina-
                                                                                                                      
41 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ), 631 F.3d 213, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (not-
ing that “the district court found that it would be difficult for UT to construct an admis-
sions policy that more closely resembles the policy approved by the Supreme Court in 
Grutter . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted), reh’g denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345). 
42 See id. at 218 n.9 (“‘If the Plaintiffs are right, Grutter is wrong.’” (quoting Fisher v. 
Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I ), 645 F. Supp. 2d. 587, 612 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (internal quo-
tations omitted)). 
43 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 247–49 (Garza, J., concurring). 
44 See id. at 247. 
45 See id. at 247, 266. 
46 See id. at 247. 
47 Id. at 248–49. Even if the Court finds a compelling state interest, the means chosen 
must still “work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the bene-
fit.” Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308 (1978). Moreover, the classification 
must “fit” the state interest “with greater precision than any alternative means.” Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
48 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 250 (Garza, J., concurring); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 
(finding that programs must consider alternatives and less restrictive means to be narrowly 
tailored). 
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tion.49 According to Judge Garza, Grutter exemplifies a more relaxed 
version of strict scrutiny because universities no longer have to use the 
most effective race-neutral policy, and courts will defer to universities’ 
“serious, good faith consideration.”50 As Justice Kennedy pointed out in 
his dissent in Grutter, “[d]eference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not 
consistent with it.”51 Grutter changed the way courts employ strict scru-
tiny in the university context and, according to Judge Garza, Grutter low-
ered the bar.52  
 Judge Garza argued that Grutter’s version of strict scrutiny was not 
only relaxed, but ambiguous.53 For example, Grutter required individu-
alized consideration of each applicant, but the Court never explained 
the meaning of “individualized consideration.”54 The Court allowed 
the use of race as a “plus” factor within the holistic review of admis-
sions, but did not say how much of a plus could be given.55 The Justices 
on the Grutter Court also did not agree on whether the Law School’s 
purported pursuit of a “critical mass” was acceptable.56 Justice 
O’Connor accepted the Law School’s pursuit of a “critical mass” be-
cause, instead of outright racial balancing, the Law School defined 
critical mass in reference to the educational benefits of diversity.57 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was more critical and opined that the Law 
School’s actual admissions practices were too inconsistent to be coher-
ently defined as seeking a “critical mass.”58 Instead, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the Law School’s practices were more akin to 
racial balancing.59 According to Judge Garza, this ambiguity makes 
“meaningful judicial review all but impossible.”60 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 248 (Garza, J., concurring); see, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496–98 (1989) (holding that remedying societal discrimination 
was an insufficient justification for using racial discrimination for affirmative action pur-
poses); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275–76 (holding that providing role models for minority stu-
dents was an insufficient justification for protecting some employees based on race). 
50 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 250–51 (Garza, J., concurring). 
51 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
52 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 249–50 (Garza, J., concurring). 
53 See id. at 258. 
54 See id. at 220–21 (majority opinion); id. at 251 (Garza, J., concurring). 
55 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321 (internal quotations omitted); Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 251 
(Garza, J., concurring). 
56 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 219 (“That the concept of critical mass bears a simple but 
deceptive label is evidenced by the division of the Justices over its meaning.”). 
57 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30 (majority opinion). 
58 See id. at 380–81, 383, 386 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
59 See id. at 386. 
60 Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 251 (Garza, J., concurring). 
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 Grutter’s relaxed, ambiguous version of strict scrutiny “encourages 
opacity” in admissions policies because it does not rely on measurable, 
hard data but rather on “intuitive appeal.”61 For example, a goal of 
viewpoint diversity is “theoretical and abstract,” cannot be proven, and 
rests on intuition rather than hard data.62 Also, like the Grutter Court, 
the Fifth Circuit did not require UT to provide conclusive data about 
how much race factors into its admissions and enrollment.63 The only 
judicial scrutiny courts can engage in under this relaxed, ambiguous 
standard is to analyze whether the admissions officials gave “serious, 
good faith consideration” to their policies.64 Judge Garza argued that 
this standard encourages opacity in admissions policies because educa-
tional institutions know that only blunt racial preference policies, such 
as quotas or point-systems, will be struck down.65  
 Judge Garza was further troubled by the ambiguous nature of Grut-
ter because it could continue to govern race-conscious admissions pro-
grams for many years.66 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor opined that the 
Court “expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”67 
Therefore, this problematic standard may be perpetuated because the 
Supreme Court has effectively suspended review of race-conscious ad-
missions programs for twenty-five years.68 The Fisher majority conceded 
that this twenty-five year benchmark is more aspirational than absolute, 
but Judge Garza was troubled that this ambiguous standard could be 
allowed to remain in place for such a great length of time.69 Without 
sufficient guidance to experiment with race-based admissions policies, 
universities may not search for a more effective system of racial inclu-
sion.70 Rather, like UT, universities “will simply model their programs 
                                                                                                                      
61 See id. at 249, 255. 
62 See id. at 255, 264 (noting that Grutter replaced the clear strict scrutiny standard with 
“an amorphous, untestable, and above all, hopelessly deferential standard”). 
63 See id. at 250, 259. 
64 Id. at 250. 
65 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 249–50 (Garza, J., concurring); see, e.g., Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007) (finding a school as-
signment program based solely on race unconstitutional); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
256, 275 (2003) (finding a university admissions policy that uses predetermined points for 
applicants based on race or ethnicity unconstitutional); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–71 (finding 
unconstitutional the use of a quota system in university admissions policy). 
66 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 251 (Garza, J., concurring). 
67 539 U.S. at 343. 
68 See id.; Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 251(Garza, J., concurring). 
69 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 222, 246 (majority opinion); id. at 251 (Garza, J., concur-
ring). 
70 See id. at 258–59 (Garza, J., concurring). 
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after the one approved in Grutter . . . .”71 The Supreme Court has since 
granted certiorari to Fisher, however, so whether the Grutter standard for 
race-conscious admissions will remain good law is uncertain.72 
III. One Ambiguous Standard, One Choice 
 Without sufficient guidance to experiment with race-based admis-
sions policies, universities may simply follow Grutter and not search for 
more effective systems of racial inclusion.73 Although Grutter provides 
one model of race-conscious admissions, the standard is ambiguous, us-
ing subjective terms such as “critical mass.”74 Therefore, universities may 
want to create better race-conscious admissions policies, but Grutter dis-
courages experimentation beyond the one approved norm.75 Warning 
of this pitfall, Judge Garza cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in United 
States v. Lopez which encouraged States to serve as “laboratories for ex-
perimentation” to test various policies and find the best solution.76 In 
order for States and their universities to serve as laboratories, however, 
the Supreme Court must provide clearer guidance about what is consti-
tutionally acceptable.77 While the Grutter Court purportedly defers to 
the expertise of educational institutions, not providing any measurable 
                                                                                                                      
71 See id. 
72 See id., cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144. 
73 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II ), 631 F.3d 213, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Garza, J., concurring), reh’g denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 
3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345). Judge Garza is against any use of race in admis-
sions policies. See id. at 247 (explaining that “race now matters in university admissions, 
where, if strict judicial scrutiny were properly applied, it should not”). 
74 Id. at 258. 
75 See id. at 258–59; see also Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (No. 11-345), 2011 
WL 5040038, at *1 (“Asian American students suffer discrimination at the hands of the 
University of Texas at Austin . . . even though, at variance with UT Austin’s stated goal of 
providing a ‘critical mass,’ Asian American students, in fact, are present in UT Austin class-
rooms in fewer numbers than ‘Hispanics,’ one of the favored ethnicities.”); L. Darnell 
Weeden, Back to the Future: Should Grutter’s Diversity Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title 
VII Implicated?, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 511, 527–28 (2005) (“The Grutter opinion is 
a dangerous precedent because its rationale for admitting qualified students . . . based on 
their racial group status perpetuates a stereotypical group status view that those students 
received the racial preference, and are thus not qualified on their own merit . . . .”); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 
115 Yale L.J. 1408, 1418 (2006) (“Ironically, it is the individualized consideration Grutter’s 
narrow-tailoring prong demands that threatens to facilitate a stereotype-laden search for 
connections between race and viewpoint.”). 
76 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 258 (Garza, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
77 See id. at 258–59. 
44 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice Vol. 32: E. Supp. 
outcomes or conceptual precision may handcuff universities to one am-
biguous standard and prevent them from experimenting.78 
 In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Kennedy predicted what happened 
at UT: that universities would not experiment with other admissions 
policies and would simply mirror the one approved in Grutter.79 Justice 
Kennedy warned that the Court’s refusal to apply meaningful strict 
scrutiny would stifle the creation of innovative admissions policies.80 He 
stated that “[b]y deferring to the law schools’ choice of minority admis-
sions programs, the courts will lose the talents and resources of the fac-
ulties and administrators in devising new and fairer ways to ensure indi-
vidual consideration.”81 Justice Kennedy believed that rigorous judicial 
review under a true strict scrutiny standard forces universities to create 
policies that are fair.82 Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on real judicial scru-
tiny to ensure universities create fair admissions policies is echoed in 
Judge Garza’s criticism that relaxed judicial review discourages universi-
ties from experimenting—both articulations value the search for better, 
fairer policies.83 
 Judge Garza warned that the Grutter standard “ensures that race-
based preferences in university admissions will avoid meaningful judi-
cial review for the next several decades.”84 If true, this is problematic 
because educational institutions are left without guidance on how to 
create admissions policies that meet constitutional standards.85 Univer-
sities may simply follow UT and implement the policy that mirrors the 
one approved in Grutter, thereby stifling experimentation with other 
admissions policies in the search for better, fairer solutions.86 
Conclusion 
 The Fifth Circuit upheld UT’s race-conscious admissions policy 
because it mirrored the admissions policy approved by the Supreme 
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger. Although the Fifth Circuit applied the strict 
scrutiny standard used in Grutter, the Grutter version of strict scrutiny is 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. 
79 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 
Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 217–18. 
80 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 393–94. 
83 See id.; Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 258–59 (Garza, J., concurring). 
84 See Fisher II, 631 F.3d at 264 (Garza, J., concurring). 
85 See id. at 258. 
86 See id. at 258–59. 
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arguably relaxed and ambiguous. In his concurrence, Judge Garza ar-
gued that this relaxed and ambiguous standard is not the correct appli-
cation of strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Grutter 
standard hinders experimentation with new admissions policies be-
cause it does not provide universities with sufficient guidance about 
what is constitutionally acceptable, and universities may simply mirror 
their admissions policies after the one approved in Grutter. Such rote 
compliance with Grutter is problematic because it discourages universi-
ties from experimenting in the search for better, fairer race-conscious 
admissions policies. 
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